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European Parliament elections in May 2019 come at a critical time in the evolution of the EU 
as these will be the first elections after the expected departure of the UK (March 2019) and at 
a time when divergence on many issues characterises member state relations. Wider 
global developments weigh heavily on Europe with the return of hard geopolitics and 
efforts to undermine the global multilateral order. The European University Institute 
(EUI) wants to highlight the major issues that are at the heart of the political agenda at 
this juncture as a contribution to the debate. The papers are part of a wider 
programme on the elections including the development of a Voting Advice Application 
(VAA), euandi2019, and an online tool specifically tailored for mobile EU citizens voting 
either in their country of citizenship or residence, spaceu2019.
This initiative on the European Parliament elections in 2019 is part of the Schuman 
Centre’s European Governance and Politics Programme (EGPP) egpp.eui.eu. Launched in 
2018, the Programme aims to foster high-quality academic research and reflection on 
the European Union and European integration with a medium to long-term perspective. 
The EGPP also promotes engagement on contemporary issues through various events, 
including blog debates and thematic conferences and workshops.
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, created in 1992 and currently directed by 
Professor Brigid Laffan, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research on the major 
issues facing the process of European integration, European societies and Europe’s place in 21st 
century global politics. 
The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major research programmes, 
projects and data sets, in addition to a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research 
agenda is organised around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing 
agenda of European integration, the expanding membership of the European Union, developments 
in Europe’s neighbourhood and the wider world. 
For more information: http://eui.eu/rscas 
The Policy Paper Series of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies complements its 
Working Papers Series. This series aims to disseminate the views of a person or a group on a 
particular policy matter, specifically in the field of European integration. 
The European University Institute and the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies are 
not responsible for the proposals and opinions expressed by the author(s). 
The aim of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies is to contribute to the public debate 
by offering views and opinions on matters of general interest. 
The EUI and the RSCAS are not responsible for the opinion expressed by the author(s). 
  
Abstract 
The EU is about values and about prosperity. When it comes to prosperity, the single market is and will 
remain the core of European integration. It is critical for the EU’s prosperity to further deepen and 
modernize the single market whilst strengthening EU policies and regulations pursuing fairness. This 
means that the prosperity generated by the single market reaches all citizens and regions whilst 
temporary losers are protected and enjoy opportunities. This paper explains why the single market is so 
important, why it is not always recognisable as many distinct names are employed, why and how 
‘fairness’ has become a major issue in terms of legitimacy and to what extent the EU can do something 
about it, what today’s single market strategy is essentially about and how the EU has attempted to match 
deepening with ‘fairness.’ Principal policy options are suggested for the near future. 
Keywords 
Market integration, single market, integration deepening, European Union, addressing fairness. 
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1. Why is the single market so important?  
As far as prosperity is concerned, the single market is the core and indeed the ‘workhorse’ of European 
economic integration. It combines the free movements of goods, services, workers (and persons) and 
capital (including direct investment) and the right of establishment of any business, big or tiny, in any 
Member State, with proportionate EU regulation where justified by market failures,1 and with cross-
border investments or networks where required. The upshot, ideally, is a genuinely EU-wide market 
with minimal market failures and proper connectivity. Such a ‘deep and wide-ranging’ single market is 
known to engender a profound and permanent stimulus to internal trade and dynamic continental 
competition (whether in goods and services and/or via foreign but intra-EU direct investment and intra-
EU flows of workers with all types of skill, together with codified technology such as patents, 
trademarks, designs and intra-company standards). Whereas the EU can serve as an anchor in terms of 
values, it acts as a magnet in terms of prosperity, given the size and the design of its single market. The 
anchor and magnet effects reinforce each other: with a large and vibrant single market, complemented 
by the economic clout of its trade policy, the anchor function can also be exercised much more 
forcefully. The EU without its single market would add up to little more than a symbolic mirror of the 
Council of Europe in terms of values, combined with a European OECD for economic policy-thinking 
and soft cooperation. It would have a purely WTO-based trade policy if indeed a customs union were 
still a part of it; if not, trade policy would inevitably fragment over time, lose its economic clout and 
become much less effective.  
It would be a serious mistake to ‘read’ what the single market is from the division of tasks within the 
European Commission or from the committee system of the European Parliament. In fact, many EP 
committees cover aspects of the single market; the same goes for many DGs in the Commission. The 
two principal reasons for the splintered treatment of the single market in the EU institutions are (i) the 
need for specialization given the complexity of regulatory solutions and both hard and soft 
infrastructure, and (ii) sectoral specificities which ought to be addressed with special expertise. 
Altogether though, the single market is the preponderant concern of EU institutions but under different 
labels, as Box 1 illustrates. 
  
                                                     
1 The five most important market failures relate to health risks (to humans and animals), safety, environment, saver and 
investor protection and consumer protection. Together, this is called ‘risk regulation.’ Usually, scientific risk assessment 
underpins EU regulation and as long as EU regulation is proportionate to such risks it can be ‘justified’ for proper market 
functioning. EU regulation is used here in a generic sense and can (and often does) include, e.g., a reference to carefully 
drafted European standards.  
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Box 1 
The single market by different names 
 Generic single market properties, such as the four free movements and the right of 
establishment, industrial goods (typically harmonizing objectives of national technical 
regulation, with reference to technical standards, for moderate-risk goods as well as 
intrusive high-risk regulation for, e.g., chemicals, medicines, cars, pesticides etc.) and basic 
services regulation (especially the very broad Services directive), mutual recognition 
(goods, services, diplomas), enforcement, market surveillance and frontier checks for 
single market purposes etc.  
 Banking Union, shorthand for the appropriate regulation, supervision and financial stability 
features of the single market for financial services and for capital markets, including 
‘resolution funds’ for failing banks and issues of deposit insurance. 
 Capital Markets Union, shorthand for EU and national reforms enabling a stronger reliance 
in the EU on equity rather than bank loans, fostering greater economic resilience during 
financial crises (i.e. smaller losses and swifter turn-around). 
 Energy Union, shorthand for the creation of an effective common gas and electricity 
network and systems (including cross-border interconnectors, i.e. costly infrastructure) and 
the appropriate regulation, technical standards, technical network codes and EU 
competition policy, whilst at the same time applying a radical shift to a low-carbon 
economy in energy use. 
 Digital single market, which began as an offshoot from telecoms and broadcasting, quickly 
broadened with a huge 2010 Digital Agenda and has now grown into a prominent and 
dynamic aspect of the single market; it is both a stand-alone area for (better) free 
movement of services and it encompasses ever more elements related to the digitalisation 
of business and the collaborative economy, with innovation and new business models 
which ought to be facilitated (within the competition and free movement disciplines). 
 Mobility packages, three successive clusters of complex measures, updated regulatory 
proposals and funding options (e.g. for infrastructure and its management) for several 
modes of surface transport (such as road and maritime; rail was dealt with in successive 
packages before, plus the nine freight rail corridors) and related modern initiatives (e.g. 
large batteries for storage); they refer to safe and clean mobility, connected and automated 
mobility, related new infrastructure issues and a series of technical measures. 
 The agri-goods complex, with highly technical sanitary and plant health rules and controls 
(plus recognition and licenses) and horizontal and specialized food and ingredients 
regulation and its alert system (RASFF). 
The importance of the single market is also a function of its long-run economic benefits. This was the 
motive in the 1957 Rome treaty (higher growth together) and it is still an overriding aim today: achieving 
greater prosperity together than each of the EU countries could realize on its own. Technically, it is next 
to impossible for economists to simulate the entire growth stimulus from the EU since the very beginning 
and compare it to a counterfactual over 60 years.2 But the BREXIT experiment now offers a unique 
explosion of empirical economic research on the benefits of the single market and of EU membership. 
When the UK leaves the EU, it will give up the economic benefits of the single market in the wide sense 
(as in Box 1) partly or entirely, depending on the relevant exit strategy. Table 1 summarizes the most 
important empirical results in the literature. 
                                                     
2 Two attempts have gone back to 1973 (Campos et al, 2014) and to 1965 (Straathof et al., 2009), which suggest respectively 
some 12% average GDP gain for all the EU countries (since 1973, except Greece) and 10% average GDP gain (since 1965). 
However, there are considerable caveats. 
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Table 1 
Simulated UK BREXIT losses in GDP, for WTO and ´no deal´ scenarios 
source date Basic explanation Effect on GDP or 
GDP trend in 
future 
EP report by 
Emerson, Pelkmans et 
al. 
Feb 2017 Average of 8 early empirical 
simulation studies on GDP effects of 
BREXIT 
- 4.21% 
UK Treasury and 
Kierzenkowski/OECD  
Both 
2016 
Average of 2 similar studies based on 
the same rich underlying economic 
model, both also in EP study above  
- 7.5% 
Vandenbussche et al 2017 Richer trade model with global-EU 
value-chains, ½ million job losses too 
- 4.5% 
Rabobank 2017 Explicitly models the determinants of 
long-run productivity growth 
- 18% 
Mayer et al 2018 Newest and rich gravity (trade) 
approach, with intermediate goods 
(note: in the WTO scenario with 
tariffs, 80 % of the negative effects are 
due to the exit from the single market, 
not to tariffs) 
- 2.9% 
UK government Nov 
2018 
i. ´no deal´ [trade-only] 
ii. FTA [idem] 
iii. ´no deal´ [trade plus zero 
inflow of EEA workers] 
iv. FTA [idem] 
- 7.7%  
- 4.9%  
- 9.3%  
 
 
- 6.7%  
Bank of England Nov 
2018 
´no deal´ (´disruptive´ or ´disorderly´) -7¾% to -10½% 
Sources: see list of references 
Table 1 shows a range of GDP losses or simulated GDP growth trends until 2030 or (Bank of England) 
until 2023. In trade models, the GDP losses remain limited though by no means trivial (from 2.9% to 
4.5%) whereas in large economic models (some with simplistic productivity effects, but in one case with 
a fully specified productivity sub-model) the effects are much more negative, ranging from 7.5% all the 
way to a 18% GDP loss from a calculated trend growth. It should be noted that Table 1 is based on a 
worst-case scenario of a full break with the single market, that is, the UK would become no more than 
any other WTO partner. This is done in order to get a rough idea of the benefits of staying ‘in’ the single 
market. It is also interesting to observe that throttling the free movement of workers causes more 
negative GDP effects. The single market is not only the core of European economic integration, it is 
also the source of significant economic benefits.  
2. The single market should be ‘fair’ and benefit ‘all.’  
That the broad idea of the single market is not controversial can be seen from the European Council’s 
unwavering support of it over many years.3 The devil is often in the details and so is shrewd lobbying 
and selective resistance, but this is not for the present paper to discuss. However, even when the EU 
                                                     
3 This also explains the well-maintained unity of the 27 in the BREXIT negotiations. 
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‘cake’ is growing, the distribution of the cake and the issue of (who bears) the adjustment costs are often 
regarded as ‘unfair’ or at least as ‘not benefitting all,’ if not creating some losers. MEPs and other EU 
policy-makers need to take this question seriously. If ‘unfairness’ were found to be correct in some 
general fashion, it would undermine the legitimacy of EU market integration, which would be disastrous.  
Nevertheless, taking it seriously does not get us very far because these issues are complicated, 
blending many factors and determinants, only some of which are directly attributable to the single 
market. There are two clusters of such issues: multiple and worsening inequalities, and compensating 
the ‘losers.’  
There are four types of inequality: inequality between EU countries; inequality between regions, 
within and among EU countries; inequality (trends) between income-earners and households; and 
wealth-based inequality. The last two of these might have at most a weak and indirect relation to EU 
market integration, but adverse trends might nevertheless feed sentiments against more market, and 
hence against more single market too. Worsening income inequality is largely due to falling or stagnant 
low-earner real income. These are often low-skilled workers and frequently living in what the World 
Bank calls “regions with low economic potential.”4 There is a long-standing skill divide in Europe and 
it has only narrowed marginally over the last 15 years and solely in the richer member states. This quasi-
permanent skill divide blocks upward social mobility for those already beginning with a cognitive 
handicap caused by their family circumstances. Changes in the EU’s sectoral specialisation and 
comparative advantages clearly favour medium- and high-skilled work, whilst low-skilled work 
incorporated in relatively simple goods and services suffers from stagnating wage pressures, given 
globalisation, and – perhaps even more – technological change. Some groups regard the single market 
as an ‘agent’ of globalisation and hence connect ‘the EU’ with bad news for the low-skilled. This linkage 
is not a credible construct: if the EU (or at least its single market) somehow collapsed tomorrow, 
technological change and globalisation and its drivers would remain just as relevant. Moreover, 
introducing national protection would cause serious and permanent damage to growth trends and 
therefore also to public spending and private consumption. In the longer run, it would not address the 
need for change either. People’s sentiments might also become mixed up with other perhaps 
understandable grudges, such as cuts in social spending, precisely during a crisis following very costly 
bank rescue operations with huge sums of public money, without – it seems – any adverse consequence 
for the managers or shareholders responsible. With such a record, the legitimacy of ‘more (single) 
market’ is bound to suffer. In other words, both objective and subjective grounds for linking inequalities 
at the personal level with a lack of legitimacy of the single market can be found and will only slowly 
recede with the return of a more healthy growth trend in the EU.5  
The link between the single market and trends in inequality between EU countries and between EU 
regions is more robust. When a developed country grows more slowly than other EU-15 countries, there 
can be many reasons for it, including the local business environment, the quality of institutions and 
governance, the insider/outsider problem in the national labour market,6 the overall skill composition of 
workers, the country’s innovation ecosystem and the sectoral composition of its goods and services. 
Similar factors play a role for ‘new’ EU member states, but they start with a much lower overall 
productivity level and a sharper divide between capital city areas and the rest of the country. With the 
intensity of competition in the single market, internationalisation via incoming FDI and links with 
European and global value chains, productivity improvement in relatively low-income countries can be 
fast and catch-up growth will be observed. This is the main reason why the EU’s single market became 
                                                     
4 World Bank (2018), chapters 1 and 3. 
5 See World Bank (2018, op. cit.) on ‘growing dissatisfaction among Europeans,’ pp. 61 – 63 for more data.  
6 Causing powerful barriers against entry into the regular labour market for workers, in turn leading to high youth 
unemployment (often, irrespective of their skill levels) and marginalized jobs without prospects.  
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known as a ‘convergence machine.’7 Figure 1 shows this steady trend: starting from 39% of the EU-15 
average in 1995, per capita incomes in new member states rose to 61% in 2017. 
Fig. 1 Convergence for new Member States           Fig. 2 Convergence among regions interrupted 
 
 
  Source: CESifo (2018), p. 67   Source: World Bank (2018), p. 45 
However, this economic convergence between EU countries coincided with divergence at the regional 
level, or, more precisely, there was modest convergence between regions before 2008 and a divergent 
trend until 2015, after which convergence set in again. When zooming in on regional convergence, 
however, it turns out that lagging regions tend to fall behind even today, probably due to their low 
economic potential. Competition and trade within the single market might not stimulate enough growth 
in these structurally weak regions but neither would a departure from the single market. Such low 
potential regions need to be supported with education programmes, upskilling, other soft and hard 
infrastructure, better governance and targeted investment programmes but, unfortunately, there should 
be no illusions about short-term catch-up growth.  
Protecting, or at least supporting, the ‘losers,’ such as workers in comparatively disadvantaged 
sectors which shrink or are transferred to low wage countries in (say) Asia, is important for the 
legitimacy of economic openness under globalisation and in the single market. However, it is just as 
much part and parcel of the economic ‘gains from trade’: compensation of losers using the overall gains 
from trade. Usually, such justified compensation is a mere fraction of these societal gains. In Europe 
this protection is much stronger than in the US 8 but the differences between EU countries are 
nonetheless considerable. Social systems in Europe rely much less on ‘trade adjustment assistance,’ 
which is typically low and project-bound and (e.g. in the US) only applied to a small share of the 
unemployed. Moreover, why single out the loss of a job due to ‘trade’ or ‘the single market’ (if this can 
be determined in the first place – there are other reasons too) instead of technology (like automation) or 
a mistaken business strategy? The European welfare states give some degree of security for a while with 
initial incomes close to the former salary so that adjustment can be organized without undue pressure. 
It is not without importance to underline that ‘losers’ are normally temporary losers; slipping into 
permanent unemployment is caused by structural factors which have little or nothing to do with the 
single market and which have to be addressed by re-skilling and personal guidance under ‘active labour-
market policies.’  
Finally, the nature of work is changing with modern technology and the platform economy. People 
doing simple routine jobs run the risk of excessive flexibility in their contracts or even multiple instances 
                                                     
7 World Bank (2012). 
8 Metivier, di Salvo & Pelkmans (2017). 
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of joblessness. This generates uncertainty, on top of wage pressure and reduced opportunities. This is 
not attributable to the single market as such, yet it is often associated with ‘more market’ by those 
affected.  
Furthermore, fairness is also linked to the state of public investment in the EU. What the Juncker 
Commission has actively stimulated (though too late to fight the crisis) is a public/private EU investment 
framework with mixed funding (EFSI). This has been successful and has paved the way for 
complementary EU investment funding linked to the single market and SME access to capital. The direct 
link with fairness seems weak, but the impact on growth and indeed on legitimacy is positive. 
3. The current EU single market strategy 
Deepening the single market is like pushing down a spring: it gets harder all the time. The Commission9 
openly complains about this problem and broadly puts the blame on the member states: “… deeper 
integration today requires more political courage and determination than 25 years ago and greater efforts 
than ever to close the gap between rhetoric and delivery. … Even when [they] express support for further 
market integration or further harmonisation, member states often promote only their domestic 
approaches as the basis for European rules. … We therefore need … a renewed commitment by leaders 
to all dimensions of the single market.” The Commission also notices that of all EU policies the single 
market acquires the highest level of support from citizens (2018 Eurobarometer, 82%).  
There is no doubt that much progress was achieved in the period 1993-2010,10 even when Mario 
Monti (2010) concluded that the to-do agenda was enormous and fragmentation still rampant. Ticking 
off the ambitious agenda implicit in Box 1, a rough judgement would yield the following:  
i. Generic single market properties: refinements of goods regulations and reference to European 
standards, their implementation (a major dossier is REACH) and enforcement (e.g. of mutual 
recognition and market surveillance, and also misuse in e-commerce); improvement of EU consumer 
law and cooperative enforcement of rights, and the new GDPR;11 initially great efforts to properly 
implement the Services Directive, which also removes barriers to the right of establishment (but leaves 
a host of problems, nonetheless) and related issues of qualification for professional services (such as 
adequate proportionality tests of the restrictiveness of national regulation).  
ii. Banking Union: much has been accomplished, and some refinements of financial regulations were 
adopted during the crisis; a gradual tightening of common supervision and stress tests; a common bank 
resolution and its institutions/funds in place and functioning; a harmonisation of deposit insurance but 
no EU/eurozone deposit insurance (shared risks) yet and non-performing loans need to be further 
minimized. 
iii. Capital Market Union: many proposals have been submitted but few adopted as yet; resistance. 
iv. Energy Union: given the far-reaching adaptation of networks and significant investments, a single 
gas/electricity market is gradually emerging; ACER, ENTSI-G and ENTSI-E turn out to have 
considerable added value (e.g. network codes); however, since the ambitious climate strategy strongly 
favours renewables, the emerging single gas and electricity market has become distorted and private 
investments have again begun to be replaced with state subsidies (for capacity, less so for renewables). 
                                                     
9 COM (2018)772 of 22 Nov 2018, The Single Market in a changing world, a unique asset in need of renewed political 
commitment, p. 1. 
10 See Pelkmans (2011). 
11 General Data Protection Regulation. 
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v. Digital Single Market: since 2015, digital has been more systematically coupled to the single 
market, including pro-competitive e-commerce,12 platforms, fintech (with a Fintech Action Plan), the 
collaborative economy and a series of new technologies for innovation (e.g. artificial intelligence, 
blockchain), the data economy (e.g. free movement of non-personal data, GDPR and ePrivacy) and 
standardised digital contracts and best (B2B) practices; cross-border consumer protection has been 
somewhat strengthened; there is resistance to mimicking EU-wide patents and trademarks (namely, EU-
wide copyright instead of solely national) and to an EU digital tax. 
vi. Mobility packages: besides a largely successful updating of EU regulations, this is above all about 
clean mobility (tougher emission rules and EU-led enforcement, which as usual is accepted with 
difficulty by member states) and automated mobility (with digital, new standards, connectivity and 
infrastructure issues) which requires time, innovation and new funding; the great potential of the EU 
freight rail corridors should be better exploited. 
vii. Agri-goods complex: largely a matter of enforcement; the application to BREXIT is troublesome. 
Of course, this rough judgment is far from complete – the single market is simply much too massive 
for a careful assessment in a short paper. However, its technicality and splintered sectoral nature render 
it next to impossible for effective high-level decision-making. Unfortunately, the fear is that the EU will 
have to live with single-market lists in the future too.  
A special additional difficulty is found in ‘regulatory heterogeneity’ between member states, which 
is a serious barrier against the Europeanisation of business, and particularly for SMEs. It is also costly. 
Regulatory heterogeneity is distinct from ‘diversity.’ Diversity in the EU is defined as (regulatory or 
other) differences between EU countries as a result of distinct preferences, which should be respected if 
the ensuing national regulations or other policies do not fall under EU competence or are covered by 
derogations. Regulatory heterogeneity, however, emerges without any reference to local preferences and 
is therefore, from the point of view of the single market, a purely cost-increasing ‘friction.’ There are 
countless national regulatory provisions which differ from analogous provisions in other EU countries 
for the sole reason that decision-making is decentralized. National decision-makers generate (often 
merely administrative) differences which are irrelevant to the (often similar) objectives of EU countries. 
Business complains a lot about these pointless differences and the EU level cannot do much.  
4. Recent EU action to match deepening with ‘fairness’  
Under the Juncker Commission, EU social regulation, its enforcement (helped by CJEU cases) and 
aspects of ‘fairness’ in the single market have been pursued more firmly. The most important move has 
been a package on ‘fair’ worker mobility, including two crucial accomplishments with respect to posted 
workers: an Enforcement Directive (2014) and a revised Posted Workers Directive (2018) based on the 
slogan ‘same wage for the same work on the same site.’13 The 2018 Directive has also increased social 
certainty for posted workers in a range of other respects, which are crucial for legitimacy. Similarly, the 
coordination regulation for the social security of all mobile workers has been tightened, including strict 
disciplines to prevent the establishment of fake (e.g. postbox) companies for dubious social purposes. 
In the same spirit, a European Labour Authority has been proposed to fight fraud, more effectively 
inspect labour practices and pursue harmonized penalties. Proposals on the social aspects of cross-border 
                                                     
12 But this is based on new directives, without unjustified geo-blocking for consumers and without excessive pricing of cross-
border parcel delivery; a 2017 directive applies VAT to e-commerce. 
13 Even though politically difficult, this slogan has been followed at least probably because east-west convergence in the EU 
has been successful (see Figure 1). However, it should be noted that this slogan disadvantages workers from the east when 
moving to the west on temporary postings, as ‘the protection of workers’ has been interpreted as local (i.e. western workers). 
Thereby, other things being equal, the demand for eastern workers will shrink and their benefits from free movement will 
consequently be smaller for a number of years until convergence approaches the EU average. 
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road transport are pending but highly sensitive. These are complicated as transport is by definition very 
mobile. They are seen as urgent for two reasons: the dreadful circumstances of eastern drivers operating 
in western Europe, and the desire for a level playing field particularly in this respect. The prevention of 
fake establishments with the sole purpose of exploiting the east-west wage gap without fairness is a 
priority. Recently, in, e.g., Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands, national courts have not accepted 
postbox companies with extremely low wages in eastern Europe as a proper framework for services 
provision, and so have imposed local wages. 
More generally, with ever deeper market integration and a degree of convergence, the consensus 
about an EU-level ‘floor’ of basic social rights has grown. In a first wave, after the Hannover European 
Council in 1988 a number of minimum social ‘standards’ were codified during the 1990s (on maternity 
leave, working hours, work agencies, part-time work etc.). In 2017, an EU Pillar of Social Rights was 
agreed in Gothenburg, so far without legal effect. However, it defines a kind of European Social Model 
which might well become relevant to the perceived ‘fairness’ of the single market. For sound subsidiarity 
reasons, however, social welfare and other policies will remain with the member states.  
As far as inequalities of a structural nature are concerned, national policies imitating ‘best (e.g. 
OECD) practices,’ targeted support from the Cohesion and Structural Funds and the Skills Agenda 
should be helpful in the medium term for regions with ‘low potential.’  
5. Policy options 
The European election and the arrival of a new Commission are welcome occasions to further explore 
the basic policy options for the single market. The best option for the single market is – certainly after 
BREXIT – for the European Council to give justified and unwavering priority to the single market in all 
its dimensions. This was not the case under Juncker, or more accurately, it was partly done via the three 
‘unions’ (banking, capital markets, energy) in Box 1 and the digital one, with other major aspects left as 
routine matters. The first two were, correctly, prioritized as critical elements of the ‘genuine EMU’ in 
the aftermath of the great recession. What matters now is that these ‘unions’ have to be completed. The 
digital single market is the prime candidate for priority in the ‘single market by different names.’ The 
rationale for this consists of the urgency of removing lingering barriers against upscaling, the belated 
consolidation of eComms and audio-video business, and the opportunity to exploit a range of new 
technologies and specialisations with a highly innovative character which require a truly single 
marketplace of continental size (if only for competition between large players). One can think of biotech, 
nanotech, mobile and cloud technology (5G, etc.), big data, 3D printing, artificial intelligence, the 
internet-of-things, robotics and energy storage (e.g. large batteries). This, combined with the EU Unitary 
Patent, given low costs and the large market size, forms a formidable incentive to innovate. One might 
surmise that the advocacy for such a new industrial revolution is a plea for good old industrial policy, 
but that would be mistaken. It is precisely the large market size and its systematic exploitation that 
should render the industrial strategy as much market-based as possible. Member states talk about these 
technologies and digital start-ups but seem incapable of addressing regulatory heterogeneity and other 
fragmentation, which prompts such start-ups to relocate to the US.  
Another heavyweight will be climate strategy and climate-related technologies and regulations. This 
is closely connected with the Energy Union, where the ‘union’ label too often conceals uncooperative 
action by member states. This is ‘justified’ by the treaty provision that the choice of energy sources is a 
national competence. There should be a vision of an EU energy and climate union where such absolute 
prerogatives at the national level are effectively constrained by the possibly adverse repercussions for 
the single market and other member state policies and their costs. The serious distortions which once 
built up in the single energy market as a result of an open-ended renewables subsidy jungle should never 
happen again.  
A Fair Single Market for EU Prosperity 
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Beyond these two dominant priorities, a way ought to be found for government leaders to assume 
more visible responsibilities in terms of delivery of the entire single market. The most problematic 
elements of such responsibilities are implementation and enforcement, as it is easy to endorse general 
statements on the desirability of such actions but politically unattractive to actually assume visible 
responsibility, that is, ‘ownership,’ for delivery. Still more importantly, what leaders of EU countries 
should also do is actively pursue single market activities inside their countries (Pelkmans [2016]), 
including a single market test in national impact assessments for all relevant national draft laws, with 
possibilities of open consultation for EU nationals and EU business.  
Another ambition would be to create modes of cooperation between European business and member 
state administrations with a view to systematically reducing the most costly, yet pointless, regulatory 
differences between EU countries which impede cross-border business. Such regulatory heterogeneity 
cannot easily be addressed by the three principal EU bodies in Brussels. OECD attempts to simulate the 
benefits of greater regulatory homogeneity generate impressive benefits.14 This is directly linked to ‘red 
tape barriers’ against starting a new business and exporting. Ciriaci (2014) shows empirically that birth 
rates of firms are positively influenced by a reduction of overly heavy red-tape barriers in member states 
and Canton & Petrucci (2017) demonstrate empirically that good business (e.g. start-up) regulations and 
public administration improve business performance, including business dynamics in the single market. 
Finally, assuming further steady economic convergence in the EU, the question arises as to whether 
and to what extent the issue of the fairness of the single market demands closer EU cooperation. More 
generally, the big societal trade-off between efficiency and equity cannot remain entirely a national 
choice but it seems that today’s EU is still far removed from what might be termed a ‘social union’ (even 
one without a tax base).  
6. Conclusions 
The EU disposes of a golden goose only if it manages to firmly further deepen and widen its single 
market and endow it with critical flanking policies (such as innovation-oriented new sectors, with the 
appropriate research and uniform standards) and funding (e.g. for EU-wide and cross-border 
infrastructure, soft and hard). The digital single market and the several links with new technologies and 
(lower) regulatory heterogeneity ought to assume the lead. As has happened in the last four decades in 
other domains, the resistance in, e.g., certain prominent services such as professional services (some 
23% of all employees in the Union!) and the difficulties in some network industries can be overcome 
even when this requires engagement as high as in the European Council and even when it does not go 
at lightning speed. It is equally critical for efficiency (generated by the single market, in particular in a 
dynamic sense) to be convincingly combined with equity for workers and citizens in all regions and EU 
countries. Neither from an economic point of view (gains from trade must be used to compensate 
temporary losers) nor from an EU legitimacy point of view (the single market should not be seen as only 
‘good for big business’ but ‘for all’) can a narrow efficiency drive be defended. BREXIT has shown 
beyond any doubt how crucial the single market is, even when the intention is to depart from the EU. 
But without the single market, as it has been shaped today and even more in the near future, the EU 
would merely be a European OECD, respectable no doubt but not generating extra income and jobs.  
  
                                                     
14 See Nordas & Kox (2009); and Fournier (2015). However, note that the OECD measures take diversity and heterogeneity 
together without distinction, so their results are an overestimate.  
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